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ABSTRACT: At the end of the Cold War, the global political arena was forever altered. 
One of the major changes was the introduction of private military contractors as 
legitimate actors of foreign policy. Despite this assertion made by scholars. private 
military contractors are an under studied political actor. This paper traces the historical, 
economic, and legal legacy of private military contractors in American history. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
At the end of the Cold War, the global political environment was significantly 
impacted. The Soviet Union ceased to be, America was entrenched as the lone 
superpower, and many scholars and pundits lauded the end of the threat of global, large 
scale nuclear devastation and warfare. Additionally, many expected the US to utilize its 
new status as superpower to ensure peace through international organizations and 
multilateral political action (Hajjar 2013; Uesseler 2008, p.113-115). No longer would 
citizens in Washington and Moscow concern themselves with the imminent threat of 
obliteration, instead the Eastern Bloc was freed, and the hope of economic development 
and political rehabilitation reigned supreme. However, the post-Cold War global political 
and military landscape would present its own number of challenges, trends, and threats 
that would test the new world order. Large scale warfare was a thing of the past in the 
eyes of Washington, Moscow, and their respective (and in some cases, former) allies, and 
many of these countries embraced demobilization and the reduction of their military 
forces as a way of diverting funds to other investments that were urgently needed 
following the demise of Soviet support (Avant 2005, p. 32; Heinecken 2014, 627-628; 
Singer 2003, p. 55) Instead oflarge scale wars, the globe was soon gripped with a rash of 
small wars and conflicts, often in places where the Cold War powers used to hold 
significant influence (Heinecken 2014, p. 627-628; Singer 2003, p.9, 49-66). As a result 
of this demobilization and reduction of armed forces, nations had to find an economical, 
yet politically safe, way of asserting influence and control over these varied and localized 
conflicts. It was this military niche that private military contractors (PMCs) filled, and the 
one that led to their prevalence on the global stage. 
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Despite their relative infancy, PMCs have had a profound impact on the post-Cold 
War world and the way in which countries fight modem wars. PMCs have served 
alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, protected numerous international 
diplomats, and ultimately have had an immeasurable impact on how the post-Cold War 
world looks. In a theoretical sense, the existence of PM Cs calls into question central 
tenets of how a liberal democracy is supposed to function in regards to the use of force, 
and how force is provisioned by liberal democracies such as the United States. 
Additionally, PMCs have played a consistent role in American foreign and domestic 
policy throughout the history of the United States. Yet, PMCs are often overlooked in 
political discussions and academic research .. Perhaps even more alarming is how little the 
American public knows about PMCs. For example, no polling data exists on the issue and 
very few mentions of PM Cs in newspapers exist. To address this latter point, the focus of 
this work will be to chart the role that PM Cs have played in American foreign and 
domestic policy. While we understand that PMCs (and mercenaries) are historical figures 
in global politics, what is less understood is the role that these actors have played in 
American history, and how that role has changed. Much of the research on PMCs has 
been focused on how PMCs behave across the world, including legal challenges and their 
impact on military missions. However, I feel that these considerations do not provide a 
complete picture of PMC behavior and their prevalence. The direction of this piece will 
be to analyze the broadness of PM Cs in American history, and thus further inform our 
understanding of PM Cs as a political actor. 
In order to demonstrate the prevalence of PM Cs, I will analyze a number of 
factors. First, the rest of this current chapter will be to provide a baseline understanding 
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of PM Cs as a political actor. While the end of the Cold War brought about their rise, the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased their visibility to not only the American public, 
but also to many policy makers in Washington, scholars, and pundits. A consideration of 
their current status is a logically important starting point. This analysis will consider the 
roles played by PMCs, their general scope, and other basic considerations of what PMCs 
are and what they do. Following this baseline analysis, I will also investigate the number 
of moral and normative arguments pertaining to PMCs in this chapter. Finally, this 
section will conclude with the research direction and questions that will guide the 
analysis that is at the heart of this manuscript, as well as a section on the salience of 
PM Cs. Following this chapter, will be analyses of the historical, economic, and legal 
legacies of PM Cs in American foreign and domestic policy, before I conclude and 
consider the findings. 
Methodology 
With the establishment of the research direction, I will now tum to the 
methodology of this analysis. This manuscript will rely on an in-depth case study analysis 
of privatization in the American military. In more specific terms, I will be considering 
how privatization in the American military, as embodied by the use of PMCs, has 
changed over time and impacted American foreign and domestic policy. I will not be 
using comparisons to other countries or advanced statistical methods, but instead will rely 
on considerations of a number of sources to establish a qualitative case. This case study 
will rely on primary sources such as Department of Defense and Department of State 
documents and findings, as well as a number of peer-reviewed secondary sources such as 
journal articles and books. The introduction will rely heavily on secondary sources as the 
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introduction's role is to establish a baseline for understanding PMCs and privatization in 
military. I believe a focused case study is valuable and appropriate for this analysis. 
PM Cs have been a underserved area of study in academia, and an in-depth and focused 
case study provides a framework for comparative analyses between policy areas and 
nation states, while also establishing a baseline for understanding the number of factors 
surrounding PMCs and how they operate. 
The analysis related to the case study will be three pronged in its approach. First, 
the historical consideration will rely heavily on secondary sources in the realm of military 
history and political science. The historical chapter will consider the role played by 
private actors in American military history, how the roles have changed, and the impact 
of these private actors on the war making apparatus. The second chapter of analysis is 
economic in its focus. The economic chapter will utilize secondary sources in its first 
section to establish a number of economic arguments related to PMCs, before 
transitioning to a second section in which primary data from government sources will be 
used to demonstrate a financial legacy of PM Cs. The final analysis chapter will be on the 
legal legacy of PMCs and will rely on court rulings and Congressional action to illustrate 
its point, in addition to peer-reviewed academic journals. 
Additionally, since this is a focused and in-depth case study a consideration of 
validity is needed. In regards to internal validity, I believe that findings and implications 
that would result from the three analysis chapters would be demonstrative of internal 
validity. I also believe that internal validity is supported by the number, variety, and 
quality of the sources utilized in the analysis. However the issue of external validity 
remains. Based on the literature, there are possibilities for external validity, particularly 
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in countries similar to the United States in terms of military investment, political pressure, 
and ideology. I will address the presence of internal and external validity throughout the 
manuscript where necessary. 
"Long Live War, Long Live Death, Long Live the Cursed Mercenary" 
The mercenary has often been a romanticized character throughout history. You 
can look to many real and fictional entities as testament to this. Han Solo from Star Wars 
was a smuggler and mercenary, as well as the "greatest bounty hunter in the galaxy" 
Boba Fett. Additionally, Rambo has worked with seemingly reliable and morally 
righteous mercenaries to save people from terrorists, and Denzel Washington and 
Leonardo DiCaprio have portrayed" respectable" mercenaries in Man on Fire and Blood 
Diamond respectively. These are specific examples of the fictionalized character of the 
mercenary that leads a life of intrigue, mystery, and danger, similar to the historical 
American obsession with gangsters, pirates, and cowboys. Yet, we must acknowledge 
that mercenaries are not simply actors of fiction, but are living, breathing humans that can 
profoundly impact how foreign and domestic policy is enacted. History has many 
testimonies to the impact of mercenaries whether it be the utilization of mercenaries by 
the Romans to protect their shores in the First Punic War, the British use of Hessians in 
the Revolutionary War, or the countless mercenary groups that have done their part in 
African civil wars (Lanning 2005). 
Yet, is it fair to label PMCs as mercenaries? That answer requires consideration of 
the definition of the word mercenary, as well as the goal and actions of PM Cs. According 
to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the definition of a mercenary is: "A soldier who is 
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paid by a foreign country to fight in its army: a soldier who will fight for any country or 
group that hires him" 
Interestingly enough, most of America's modem PMCs meet this definition, while 
also completely working around it and exhibiting unique characteristics. For example, 
while PM Cs are certainly paid for their work, it is inaccurate to claim that they are being 
paid by a foreign country, or that they would fight for any entity that would pay them due 
to the fact that many of America's PMCs consist of American citizens who have either 
worked in police work or in the armed forces, and therefore exhibit some semblance of 
patriotism and commitment to an ideal (Franke and Boemcken 2011, p. 726 and 737; 
Hajjar 2013, p.128). This loyalty is exhibited most obviously in the words of Erik Prince, 
founder of the largest, and perhaps most infamous PMC, Blackwater. In his book on the 
exploits of Blackwater, regarding Operation Enduring Freedom, Prince (2013, p.56) 
writes: 
"Blackwater's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom wasn't ever 
conceived as a business decision. We certainly received no money for it. 
The team in Moyock wanted to help the United States strike back at the 
men who attacked it, and opening our Rolodex and acting as facilitators 
was one way we could do so" 
Based on these examples, America's PMCs are not simply "new mercenaries," 
but are instead a new political actor that has some similarities to the mercenaries 
of old. Singer (2003, p. 47) presents a more thorough and clear definition and 
framework of the definitional basis of the modem American PMCs that are the 
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focus of this manuscript. Singer (2003, p.45) argues that while PMCs and 
mercenaries are both paid by nation-states to assist in military operations, PMCs 
are inherently different because they undertake a "corporatization" of military 
service. Going further, Table 1 highlights how Singer (2003, p. 47) presents a 
number of other attributes of the modem PMC that makes them unique: 
Table 1: What makes PM Cs unique? 
Organization Prior Corporate Structure 
Motives Business, not individual, profit driven motives 
Open Legal and publicly traded entities 
Market 
Services Variety of clientele and range of services 
Recruitment Public and specialized 
Linkages Ties to corporations and financial markets 
Source: Singer 2003, p.47. 
The historical and fictional mercenaries were often a loosely structured 
gang of morally questionable men and women who would fight for any side. As 
demonstrated here, PMCs differ from the old mercenaries in their values, motives, 
structure, and also in a number of other ways. It is therefore unfair to label PM Cs 
as simply a new variety of mercenary; one must understand and study them as 
what they are: a unique political actor. 
The Multifaceted Actor 
PMCs as they currently stand are a thriving, relevant, and long standing 
force in global and domestic political life. Due to a number of related caveats, 
PMCs have traditionally been a luxury for only the most advanced, prosperous, 
! 
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and usually, Western countries. This trend is true due to a number of advantages 
that include material wealth, military "know-how," and above all: a need for 
security (Uesseler 2008, p.31 ). Other scholars have argued that a liberal political 
culture is riper for PMC use than say "countries founded on the republican theory 
of the social contract such as Germany" (Cusumano and Kinsey 2014, p. 3; 
Krahmann 2010). As a result of these variables, PMCs have had the greatest 
presence in Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
For example, several European countries contributing forces to the War in 
Afghanistan used a PMC out of Ukraine for transportation (Singer 2005, p.122). 
However, despite the Western bend that seems apparent, PMCs are truly a global 
actor. For example, PMCs have fought on every continent of the world except for 
Antarctica, and some major PMC groups call South Africa and Israel home 
(Shearer 1998, p.71; Singer 2005, p.121-122). PMC forces are often made up of 
persons from countless countries throughout the world including Nepal, Israel, 
and parts of Africa and most of these persons are ex-military or police, often from 
special operations groups such as the SAS (Singer 2003, p. 76; Uesseler 2008, 
p.40). 
As discussed earlier, some see PMCs as modem day mercenaries (justly or 
not), yet PM Cs offer a plethora of services unique to themselves. Singer (2003, 
p.73) argues that all PMCs offer services that have traditionally fallen "with the 
domain of national militaries." However, this does not mean that all PMCs are 
fighting alongside traditional armed forces; instead that capacity is just one of the 
many services offered. For example, Percy (2006, p.11) asserts that PMCs 
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provide four types of service: logistical support, operational or tactical support, 
military advice and training, and policing and security. Examples of each type of 
service can be found in Table 2 (Percy 2006, p.11-13; Terry 2010, p. 661; 
Uesseler 2008, p.21-26): 
Table 2: Examples of the services provided by PMCs 
Logistical The preparation and delivery of food and/or laundry to 
Support military bases/construction and maintenance of military 
bases/refueling and storage capabilities/operation and 
maintenance of telephone and radio bases/recreational 
accommodations I 
Operational and The planning and implementation of combat I 
' 
Tactical Support missions/gathering intelligence and data using 
electronic and digital means, as well as traditional 
means and the consolidation of this information for 
i 
military use I I 
-
Military Training domestic and foreign police and security 
Training forces in basic weapon usage, as well as more advanced 
military skills such as piloting an aircraft or driving a 
tank ~ Policing and Protecting and escorting diplomats and other high i 
! 
Security ranking officials/ escorting of convoys/ protection of 
vital institutions/ use as security forces in international 
peacekeeping arrangements/ protection of third parties 
in conflicts such as refugees and displaced persons 
Sources: Percy 2006, p.11-13; Terry 2010, p.661;Uesseler 2008, p.21-26. 
As a way of streamlining their services, PM Cs often "package" their services 
together in a manner similar to the packaging of home, TV, and internet together 
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by cable companies. One example of this bundling of services can be found in the 
advertising of the PMC Trojan Security Services. Trojan argues that it offers 
"maritime security" to those entities that hire them, and this can entail security 
consulting, counter-terrorism efforts, vessel escort and recovery, and a litany of 
other related services (Uesseler 2008, p. 22). While PM Cs provide a number of 
services that appear to support or advance the missions they are involved in, there 
still exist a number of theoretical challenges to the act of privatizing military 
services. 
PMCs as Problem, and Problem Solver? 
The theory of collective action is rooted in the work of Olson's ( 1965) 
seminal piece The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. In political science and related fields, collective action is often used to 
examine how public goods are provisioned by any number of actors and the 
impact of externalities. Olson ( 1965) argues that groups that participate in 
collective action often have to contend with "free riders" attempting to benefit 
from the good, without contributing to it. Due to the non-excludable nature of 
public goods, this is almost impossible to stop. National defense is the epitome of 
a collective good, yet the problem lies in the fact that it is incredibly difficult to 
attain cooperation from the multitudes to engage in this public good, and also that 
the associated cost is too high for individuals or small groups to solve it. PMCs 
may be a solution to the collective action problem of national defense as the 
decision making to use force would be driven by economic and market demands, 
and less by the public sphere. 
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While the analysis has shown that PMCs are global actors that undertake a variety 
of missions and tasks and can solve problems, several criticisms exist regarding PM Cs. 
One concern that many scholars have is that utilizing PMCs directly violates or 
challenges the historical monopoly that the state has had on the use of force in a 
theoretical and practical sense (Chesterman and Lehnardt 2007; Heinecken 2014; Pattison 
201 O; Percy 2006; Singer 2003; Uesseler 2008). This concern has multiple viewpoints 
and approaches, and it would be useful and insightful to analyze the multitude of ways in 
which this concern is viewed. In the broadest sense, scholars are concerned about PMC 
interruption of this relationship between state and military forces because democratic 
control over the use of force is an invaluable resource for self-governance and individual 
autonomy (Pattison 2008, p.153) In nation-states, such as the US, where democracy is a 
guiding tenet of civic life, it is important for Americans to have some say in when force is 
used. Additionally, democratic control, it is argued, leads to more peaceful relations and 
behavior when interacting with other democracies (Owen 1994, p. 97-125) As we have 
seen, PMCs are primarily based in richer, more industrialized, and liberal Western 
countries. It is therefore concerning that some theorists believe that the use of PM Cs 
could impact the relationships between countries of this ilk. 
According to Deborah Avant (2005, p. 5-6), PMCs can impact "control of force" 
because, as mentioned earlier, PMC presence could impact who can control violence. 
Continuing, Avant (2005, p. 5-6) asserts that "control" can be measured in three ways: 
Functional, political, and social. Functional control measures the effectiveness of the 
military itself, political control impacts those political actors that control force, and social 
control relates to how force is used in concert with societal viewpoints such as social 
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justice, democracy, and human rights (Avant 2005 p.5-6; Percy 2006, p. 15-16).Percy 
(2006, p.16) also makes the argument that in addition to affecting how each of these 
types of control function, PM Cs can also impact how the three types work together. 
However, many argue that just because PMCs could impact the control of force, 
that does not mean that they have or will, nor does it mean that some private control is 
inherently bad. Lindsay Cohn (2011, p.382) makes the argument that there is no reason to 
expect the civil sphere to have less control over a PMC than over a traditional military 
force as they both are under a contract, and seek to continue to receive contracts, 
promotions, and accolades. Additionally, Cohn (2011, p.382) makes the case that the use 
of PM Cs could actually provide more control for the civil government when compared to 
traditional armed forces. For example, utilizing PMCs could eliminate what is referred to 
as the "bored soldier" dilemma, that is states are perpetually debating whether to keep a 
large army, or demobilize, and possible impact domestic policies, and PMCs could 
provide long-standing services such as air forces that are far too expensive and 
specialized otherwise (Cohn 2011, p. 382). Overall though, both Cohn (2011) and Avant 
(2005) believe that the granting PM Cs some control in regards to the use of force can be 
helpful if utilized in the correct way and with the extensive regulations and a competent 
state system. 
Despite the arguments presented, many scholars are still skeptical of, if not hostile 
towards, the way "control of force" will be affected by PMCs. Uesseler (2008, p.173) 
argues "governments' duty to their citizens is to maintain security, which includes 
democratic control over the use of force" and that this necessary balance "cannot be 
reconciled" as long as PM Cs are driven by profits instead of national interests. 
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Additionally, Ken Silverstein (2000, p.143) believes that the state embrace of PMCs is 
dangerous and that PMCs are the ''footsoldiers of privatization, by which the 
responsibilities of government are transferred to corporate hands." Silverstein (2000, p. 
xvii) also contends that the US should abandon the use of PMCs in order to "construct a 
defense policy based on real issues and threats" and not one that is driven by profit 
margins and "small groups of hardliners." Another scholar skeptical of the loss of control 
is Lindy Heinecken. In her piece "Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen 
Consequences for the Military Profession", Heinecken (2014, p.630) argues that the use 
of PM Cs means that ''the armed forces no longer held the exclusive monopoly over the 
management and application of violence." Additionally, Heinecken (2014, p. 631-638) 
believes that the introduction of private fighters may have some benefits, but their impact 
on military autonomy, skills, sense of "corporateness," and service ethic makes her 
especially critical and skeptical of their wide use and application. 
Pattison, a political theorist, finds contention with some aforementioned scholars 
such as Avant and Cohn, in that Pattison believes that the privatization of force is 
fundamentally and inherently unethical and \\-Tong, and that no level of regulation can 
reverse this (Pattison 2010, p. 427). Much of Pattison's argument centers around 
questions and concerns that he has about the motives, and not so much the intentions, of 
those people whom make up PM Cs. Motives, as Pattison argues, consist of underlying 
reasons for doing something, while intentions are objectives or purposes (Pattison 2010, p. 
433). While a private contractor may have noble intentions such as protecting innocents 
or protecting important politicians and diplomats, the motivation behind these intentions 
are inherently immoral because they are based entirely on the idea of making money. As 
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Pattison (2010, p.433-434) writes "the issue of motives ... presents a potentially deeper 
objection" for three reasons: 
1. Motives matter in moral judgment. 
2. It is problematic if individuals are motivated by financial gain in the context 
of military force, given that military force harms others. 
3. Private contractors are more likely to be motivated by financial gain than 
regular soldiers 
Pattison makes the argument that because of the presence of these three variables, and the 
fact that they are uncontroversial and generally agreed to, American policy makers 
should be strongly dissuaded from using PMCs as they provide no benefits, yet come 
with some significant moral challenges (Pattison 2010, p. 435). Unlike traditional armed 
forces who are motivated by duty, sense of self, and commitment to national ideals or 
missions, the self-interested motives of PM Cs present significant moral challenges for 
American foreign policy makers and the way our country justifies military action. 
Utilizing the theoretical framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR), some 
scholars have found legitimate concerns regarding the responsible nature of PMCs. To 
start, CSR calculates the responsibility of a firm in four areas: economic legal, ethical, 
and philanthropic (Carroll 1979). Using this framework, many have not even attempted to 
analyze PMCs as they are seen as ethically questionable at the outset and violate CSR by 
their very nature. For example, E. F. Byrne (2007, p.210-217), argues that PMCs would 
fail CSR tests because they harm the environment, violate human rights, cull profits 
unethically, and abuse political power. Despite Byrne's insistence on the unethical nature 
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of PM Cs, others believe that his complaints are questionable at best. In their piece 
"Products That Kill and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of U.S. Defense 
Firms," Halpern and Snider (2012) find that PMCs can exhibit traits of CSR and are not 
inherently immoral. assuming they participate in philanthropy and contribute to national 
interests in some capacity. 
PMC Salience with the American Public 
The purpose of this research is to chart the prevalence of PMCs in American 
foreign and domestic policy, and one way to do that is to track the salience of the issue in 
the eyes of the American public. A brief consideration of how prevalent PM Cs are to the 
public, as understood through salience, will provide a comparative lens in which to 
consider the findings in the forthcoming analysis chapters and is a integral part of 
charting the depth of PMC presence in American history. The issue of salience is 
important for a number of reasons. First, we understand that citizens base their opinions 
of the president on how he/she acts regarding issues that are salient to the public 
(Edwards et.al. 1995, p.121-122). Following from this understanding, one could reason 
that how a president acts on non-salient issues has little impact on his electoral viability, 
and that the president has wide latitude in dealing with low salient issues. However, the 
way in which salience has been measured has fluctuated over time. Yet, for this 
manuscript, we will be relying on Epstein and Segal's (2000) model for measuring 
salience. While we understand that elite political actors are judged by the public on how 
they deal with salient issues, Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a model for determining 
how these elite actors determine issue salience, and therefore what issues to be concerned 
with. Esptein and Segal (2000, p.72) argue that the most consistent and effective way of 
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measuring issue salience is to measure how often and prominently an issue is feature in 
major media outlets, and for their case, specifically how often an issue is featured on the 
front page of, or in a headline in, The New York Times. Utilizing this model, I will use 
the Lexis-Nexis database and research tool to do a search of four terms: Private military 
contractor, private security contractor, mercenary/mercenaries and Blackwater. The first 
three terms present most commonly used acronyms and titles for the actor that is being 
considered, and the final is the most notorious and infamous PMC group, as they were 
the focus of Congressional investigations in the mid-2000s. I will be searching for 
mentions of these terms in headlines only, and with no date restrictions. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 3: 
Table 3: Results of Lexis-Nexis Search for PMC Search Terms in the New York Times 
from 1984-2014 
Term Searched m Lexis-Nexis Database Number of matches 
from The New York Times from 1984-
2014 
Private Military Contractor (PMC) 0 
Private Security Contractor (PSC) 0 
Mercenary (Mercenaries) 21 
Blackwater 15 
Source: Lexis-Nexis 
As you can see from this brief snapshot of salience, PM Cs are not covered frequently or 
in great numbers by The New York Times. While PMC and PSC received zero matches in 
the entirety of The New York Times publication history, Blackwater and mercenary 
received some matches. It should be noted that almost all of the mentions of Blackwater 
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are from the mid-2000s, which is logical due to the Nisour Square Massacre and the 
subsequent Congressional investigation, while the mercenary tag resulted in some 
matches that dealt with issues other than PMCs. Overall, the salience measure presented 
by Epstein and Segal (2000) indicates that PMCs are not a well known or salient issue to 
the American public or policy elites. 
To provide even more support to this consideration of salience, I consider polling 
data related to the privatization of force and private military contractors. While mentions 
in a large and notable newspaper presents one angle of understanding PMC salience, the 
consideration of people being asked directly about PMCs provides perhaps a more 
insightful understanding of the issue. If we can see, from polling data, that citizens are 
concerned about, or have opinions of, PMCs, we can provide a greater contextual 
understanding of their salience to the American public. I chart this by using three of the 
largest and most often used polling data sources: American National Election Studies, 
Gallup, and PollingReport.com. Additionally, I utilize the same search terms mentioned 
above to provide continuity. Interestingly enough, a search of the same terms mentioned 
above garnered zero results from ANES data, Gallup, and PollingReport.com. While no 
data appears to present a challenge to the research design, I would argue the opposite. If 
these prominent and well respected public opinion sources have not even attempted to 
gauge where the public stands on the issue of the privatization of military force, what 
does that say about its salience and importance to the American public? It is again clear 
from this consideration that PMCs are not a well known issue to the American public, or 
one that many political elites consider when developing policy. 
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While we see that PMCs are not particularly salient to the American public, one 
of the reasons for this may be related to what economists call the "casualty sensitivity" 
effect. This effect argues that public support for wars is noticeably impacted by the 
number and visibility of casualties (Larson and Savych 2005). This argument is 
supported by Eichenberg (2005) as his work shows that the mere inclusion of the casualty 
phrasing in questions greatly lowers support, and that public support is impacted by the 
perception of casualties, particularly in post-Saddam Iraq. However, due to a number of 
factors including incomplete data and legal hurdles, contractor deaths are rarely reported 
or included in the death tolls of recent wars, despite the fact that contractor deaths have 
ranged anywhere from 20-30% of all US deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan (Schooner and 
Swan 2012). This leads to the public being unaware of these deaths, or in some cases not 
sensitive to or interested in the number of contractor deaths, therefore affecting how 
salient the issue truly is the public (Schooner and Swan 2012). As Jon D. Michaels (2010, 
p754-755) writes: 
"Private contractors are politically valuable insofar as they neither 
enter into official head or body counts - nor, it appears, into our hearts. 
That is to say, the nation identifies with its troops, to a far greater extent 
than its contractors: "Americans are accustomed to hearing the military 
death toll. But largely absent from the public consciousness are the 
thousands of civilians putting their lives on the line as contractors in Iraq." 
Combining US military personnel and contractors in combat zones thus 
allows for contractors to lighten the troops' share of long tours, injuries, 
and other emotional and physical hardships. But even more importantly, 
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the aggregate loss of life is discounted by the fact that we neither hear as 
much about nor, evidently, care as much about homesick or fallen 
contractors." 
Unfortunately, it appears that the low salience of PMCs is not without its cost. 
While the American public does not know (or does not care) about PM Cs, they 
are still fighting and dying alongside traditional armed forces. Overall, the 
consideration of salience provides an additional reason for the prevalence of 
PMCs in American foreign and domestic policy. 
Research Direction and Focus 
So far the research has focused on addressing what PMCs are, what they 
do, a number of challenges related to them, and what the public knows (or does 
not know) about them. The rest of the research will be focused on establishing the 
long standing prevalence and presence of PMCs as a political actor in American 
foreign and domestic policy. As mentioned earlier, this analysis will manifest 
itself in a variety of ways including both qualitative and quantitative methods, and 
will cover the political and military, economic, and legal existence of PMCs as a 
way of demonstrating their heavily entrenched and historic existence in the 
American political lexicon. All of the research is attempting to answer two central 
questions: what role have PMCs played in American history? And how has this 
role changed over time? The forthcoming chapters address these central 
questions by narrowing their focus even further. In Chapter 2, the focus will be on 
analyzing the role PMCs have played in American political and military history 
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and how they have impacted our foreign and domestic policy goals. In Chapter 3 
the main question will be: how prevalent are PMCs in an economic sense? And in 
Chapter 4 the research will consider if there are any legal regulations or baselines 
for PMCs, and analyze the legal standing and history of PMCs in American 
foreign and domestic policy. In answering these questions and addressing these 
concerns, a more clear and thorough understanding of the prevalence of PM Cs in 
American political life will present itself and this will help us to understand how 
this aspect of the "provision of military force has maintained some of its basic 
structure, while also radically changing, and the various roles PMCs have played 
in American history. 
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Chapter Two: Historical Analysis of PM Cs 
Mercenaries and Early America 
Mercenaries are as old as war itself. While the Romans, Chinese, and 
other long standing empires utilized mercenaries to varying degrees, the focus of 
this analysis will be on the role played by mercenaries in American history. While 
I make the case that PMCs (and actors like them) have had a long standing 
involvement in American foreign and domestic policy, the first interaction 
between American forces and mercenaries was not befitting of this relationship. 
Breaking a longstanding peace, American colonists struck out against their British 
rulers on April 19th, 1775 at Lexington and Concord. While King George and his 
military advisers expected a quick routing of the peasant revolt, the American 
colonists killed over 200 British forces at Lexington and Concord as well as 800 
troops at Bunker Hill a few months later (Lanning 2005, p. 79-80). In response to 
this slaughter, the British quickly employed the use of German mercenaries, 
whom the American Colonists referred to as Hessians due to their area of origin, 
to fight their war. This employment of mercenaries would play a significant role 
in American independence as American Colonists viewed the war as a "internal, 
family affair" and that the introduction of mercenaries was barbarous and 
tyrannical (Lanning 2005, p.82) This feeling manifested itself as one of the 
complaints registered by the colonists in The Declaration of Independence, as the 
Founders wrote "He (King George) is at the moment transporting large armies of 
foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolations and tyranny." 
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Despite the angered reaction to the British use of mercenaries, the early American 
military also employed contractors and mercenaries to some extent. 
Following a period of ineffectual logistical support, Congress centralized 
logistical operations under Robert Morris, a Philadelphia merchant and 
Superintendent of Finance (Kidwell 2005, p.10). Morris' new system of logistical 
support to the Continental Army relied heavily on private individuals to deliver 
goods and services, as large numbers of cooks, laborers, medics, and laundresses 
accompanied the army on its journey (Kidwell 2005, p.10). This early logistical 
body would lay the groundwork for the more nuanced and specialized model that 
would be utilized in modem wars. In addition to the use of private entities and 
laborers to support the war effort, the Continental Army employed mercenaries in 
other ways. For example, Baron Van Steuben, a German mercenary was 
instrumental in molding the Continental Army into a coherent fighting force 
through his extensive military training at Valley Forge (Singer 2003, p. 33). As 
illustrated here, the Continental Army not only battled mercenaries, but also 
utilized them and other privatized forces to better improve their logistical and 
military capabilities. The presence of mercenaries was prevalent in American 
society from the start. 
Following the triumph of the Continental Army and the establishment of a 
new Republic, American lawmakers sought to build upon the work done by 
Robert Morris in streamlining logistical support for military forces in an effort to 
strengthen the struggling, and generally weak, American military. While The 
Constitution granted the President control over the military, spending related to 
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the military, including procurement and logistics rests with Congress. Initially, the 
President sought and exercised control over the procurement of military support 
resources, leading to waste and abuse in a number of instances. In response, in 
1798 Congress passed legislation forcing contracts to be the subject of a 
competitive bidding process with a number of regulations and caveats including 
no advanced payments or Congressional profiteering from contracts (Kidwell 
2005, p. 11). Congress also attempted to further simplify the process by placing 
the process of bidding and purchasing under the auspices of military agencies 
such as the Corps of Engineers, but scholars argue that this bevy oflegislative 
activity did very little to simplify or streamline the process of contracting 
(Kidwell 2005, p.10-12). 
Overall, this inefficient system of contracting out for a number of essential 
goods and services existed until the end of the 19th century. Starting with the 
Mexican War of 1846, the US military began to professionalize and make 
substantial strides in reforming and standardizing internal logistical operations, as 
well as to establish safeguards to protect against fraud and waste from outside 
contractors (Kidwell 2005, p. 12). Playing into this evolution was the nation's 
improving infrastructure and new modes of transportation, as well as significant 
investments from the War Department (Huston 1966). However, one alarming 
trend of the mid-19th century contracting process was the cozy relationship 
between some Union officers and contractors, one that often resulted in 
sweetheart deals for both sides, while impacting quality and military preparedness 
(Kidwell 2005, p.12) Despite an investigation by the House of Representatives, 
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these practices continued for the duration of the Civil War, mostly due to the 
difficulty of passing legislation in wartime. While the logistical situation 
improved somewhat during the mid-19th century, a major problem still existed: 
No decision had been made whether to create an internal logistical operation to 
supply forces by any major political or military actor, and the 19th century US 
army would continue to take competing paths on the issue, often resulting in 
continued contractor waste and abuse, as well as impacted army efficiency 
(Kidwell 2005, p.12). 
At the dawn of the 20th century, most political and military leaders 
acknowledged and understood that a professionalization of the US Armed Forces 
was urgently needed. Following the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the 
newly found understanding of the need to project force globally, the flaws in the 
logistical system were obvious and numerous (Shrader 1999, p.5). To correct 
these shortcomings and to better prepare for the challenges of the new century, 
Congress enacted sweeping and important legislation to improve military 
contracting and logistics. In 1912, Congress combined a number of smaller 
departments into the Quartermaster Corps to improve efficiency and eliminate 
waste (Huston 1966, p.294). This led to a centralized and consistent body of 
enlisted men that were solely responsible for the logistical aspect of warfare, thus 
ending some of the aforementioned abuses and flaws in the system that plagued 
earlier military endeavors. 
When America entered World War 1 in 1917, the US Expeditionary 
Forces were supported by a private-public partnership not seen in American 
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history at the time. This partnership was defined by the founding of the War 
Industries Board, an entity populated with government and business leaders 
whose sole purpose was to ensure that the whole the American industrial strength 
was adequately and accurately utilized in the war effort (Kidwell 2005, p. 13). 
Additionally, Congress ensured that abuses and waste were minimized, a practice 
in stark contrast to the process that plagued 18th and 19th century military 
campaigns, by banning advanced payments, closing loopholes, and through a 
number of other contract protections (Kidwell 2005, p.13; Smith 1985, p.220). 
Overall, the private-public cooperation of World War 1 was in sharp contrast to 
the waste and abuse of earlier wars, and would be indicative of the future of the 
relationship in the 20th century. 
The Beginning of Modern PM Cs 
Up until the mid-20th century, the role of contractors in the American 
military was strictly ad-hoc and localized. However, the changing nature of 
warfare and growth in technology would alter their contributions significantly. 
When World War 2 broke out in 1939, American political and military leaders 
were happy to stay home, yet they also began to mobilize and enact policies to 
ensure preparedness. Before 1941, the American government awarded contracts 
to a number of domestic firms to provide logistical support and training to 
American allies in the Middle East and North Africa as a part of the Lend-Lease 
program (Kidwell 2005, p.13). Following American entry into the war, many of 
these contracts were converted into military roles, yet the civilian impact on how 
the war would be fought would be immense. Instead of being solely domestic 
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entities that provided logistics and some training, contractors during World War 2 
were often at as much risk as regular armed forces due to their presence in 
military situations in North Africa, Europe, and other theaters of the Second 
World War. 
Technological innovations brought about vehicles and implements of war 
that were often far too complicated to be repaired by regular soldiers. In response 
to this reality, Allied forces required the construction of facilities in the field to 
repair ordnance and vehicles. This task fell to private contractors, and more 
specifically, the J.G White Engineering Corporation before eventually falling to 
military actors when enlistment numbers increased (Shrader 1999, p. 6). For the 
first time in American history, forces that were not solely military were 
accompanying armed forces into hostile zones to achieve military goals. Historian 
Lida Mayo writes that some leaders at the time saw "inherent dangers in assigning 
to a civilian contractor tasks that were essentially military" (Kidwell 2005, p.13). 
This viewpoint echoes the sentiments of some normative challenges presented 
earlier, as well as the arguments put forth by scholars during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars. Overall, while military actors eventually took over the 
responsibilities of contractors during World War 2, the mere presence of civilians 
on the battlefield in military roles would prove the first indication of what was to 
come. 
The precedent established regarding private contractors during World War 
2 would continue during the Korean War of 1950, albeit with some notable 
differences. For starters, enlistment for US armed forces was significantly smaller 
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than in World War 2, and this led to greater reliance on contractors to undertake 
essential operations on the battlefield alongside military actors (Kidwell 2005, p. 
15; Shrader 1999, p.7-8). However, many of these contractors were Korean and 
Japanese, and this lessened the domestic human and economic cost, much to the 
benefit of policy makers, a fact that would negatively impact future wars and the 
way policy makers viewed contractors (Kidwell 2005, p.15). Overall, many 
historians believe that without the commitment of these Korean, Japanese, and 
American contractors, the mission would have suffered as traditional forces 
would have had to undertake significant support roles (Huston 1966; Kidwell 
2005; Shrader 1999) Overall, the Korean War was a continuation of the trend 
established by the Second World War of having contractors in battlefields acting 
in military roles. While the Korean War and Second World War showed the ever 
inclusive role of contractors in warfare, a prevalence that was startling when 
compared to earlier wars, private inclusion would continue to evolve and grow in 
the American military operations of the Cold War. 
PMCs in the Cold War 
Early American wars featured contractors in supply and logistic roles 
primarily, yet this role changed significantly during the Cold War. 1As touched 
upon earlier, contractors can undertake a variety of roles and responsibilities. For 
example, much of the work done by earlier contractors (particularly pre-World 
1 It is also important to note before I continue that I do understand and accept that the Korean War 
technically occurred during the period most historians refer to as the "Cold War," but the way contractors 
behaved in the Korean War were more similar to the contractor behavior in World War 2 than in wars 
that would follow it. I therefore made the decision to separate the wars based on contractor behavior 
instead of chronological order 
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War 2 contractors) was in the realm of logistical support. However, the nature of 
the Cold War led to a greater reliance on contractors that acted in different ways. 
One such case was the Pentagon's commitment to FFRDCs or federally funded 
research and development centers. These FFRDCs served as analysts and "think 
tanks" for much of the 1950s and especially during the 1960s and Robert 
McNamara's tenure as Defense Secretary (Chambers II 1999, p.185). These 
FFRDCs served an operational and tactical support role to US Armed Forces, The 
Joint Chiefs, and the Defense Department, and were solely funded by annually 
approved federal contracts (Chambers II 1999, p.185-186). These FFRDCs were 
just one example of contracting during the Cold War however. 
While FFRDCs introduced a new type of contractor to the Cold War, the 
American effort in Vietnam still relied on contractors for significant logistical 
support. Since the Vietnam War was relatively unpopular domestically, leading to 
low enlistment and concerns over political viability, policy makers employed 
large numbers of contractors for absolutely essential roles that were traditionally 
military including construction, base operations, and transportation (Shrader 1999, 
p.8). Due to this increased demand for logistical support, a number of companies 
including Brown and Root, J .A. Jones, and KBR reorganized themselves in order 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by this new war (Kidwell 2005, 
p.16). While World War 2 and the Korean War were responsible for the 
contractor presence on the battlefield, the economic opportunities presented by 
the Vietnam War and the related political environment led to another central tenet 
of modern PMCs: corporate structure. Overall, due to the scope and duration of 
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the war, the Vietnam War featured the largest contractor presence in American 
history, a presence that was calculated at 52,000 contractors at the height of the 
war in 1969 (Shrader 1999, p.8). 
While we have seen that logistical support from contractors has been a 
long standing staple of American foreign and domestic policy, the Cold War was 
also the breeding ground for the type of contractor that would run rampant in the 
post-Cold War global arena: the contractor that was involved in policing, security, 
and the use of force. At the height of the Vietnam War, the US government was 
responsible for funding and equipping Korean, Thai, and Filipino soldiers to fight 
the Vietcong (Lanning 2005, p.143). While not exactly the domestic contractors 
that are the focus of this paper, this example is still important as it is one of the 
earliest instances of the American government hiring non-traditional armed forces 
to use force. Similar to the employment of these Asian mercenaries, the Reagan 
Administration utilized a number of former British Special Operations soldiers to 
participate in military action against the Marxist government of Nicaragua 
(Geragthy 2009, p. 142-147). Additionally, throughout the Cold War, the CIA and 
National Security Council utilized private individuals and actors to achieve a 
number of military objectives in Latin America, the Soviet Bloc, and the Middle 
East (Geragthy 2009; Kidwell 2005; Silverstein 2000). 
Overall, the role of the private contractor evolved more in the roughly 40 
year span of the Cold War than in the 150 some years of American existence that 
preceded it. Instead of a roughly assembled network of logistical support actors, 
corporate structures began to form to efficiently provide support, while sucking 
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up considerable government contracts. While logistics improved and changed 
during the Cold War, the true last impact was the introduction of objective 
support contractors that aided in analysis and targeting, as well as in actually 
utilizing force to achieve military ends. The contractor that had always been 
around had started to change in considerable ways, and the end of the Cold War 
would alter private contractors and the roles they played in numerous and 
significant ways. 
The End of the Cold War and LOGCAP 
As we have seen up to this point, private contractors have played a notable 
role in American military and political history. However, while this relationship 
has existed for a significant amount of time, it was not until the end of the Cold 
War that the relationship changed significantly, and we saw the arrival of the 
multifaceted and controversial actors that were established earlier on in this 
research. As previously, mentioned there were a number of factors related to the 
end of the Cold War that were instrumental in the development and rise of these 
modem PM Cs including the changing nature of warfare, domestic commitment to 
privatization, and military demobilization, In the early 1990s, contractors played a 
central role in the First Gulf War, a role very similar to the role played by 
contractors in Vietnam, one of logistical support in terms of supply and 
construction (Kidwell 2005, p.19;Shrader 1999, p.10) However, this seemingly 
routine role would be a driving force behind a major development in the realm of 
security contracting. 
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After seeing the benefits of contractors in Vietnam and the First Gulf War, 
civilian lawmakers issued the first contract under (the program was established 
before the end of the Cold War) the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) with the expressed purpose of normalizing military relations with 
security contractors and so that the US military "could fulfill missions without 
always having to use military assets directly" (Kidwell 2005, p.19; Shrader 1999, 
p.10). This arrangement was a significant jump forward for integration of 
contractors into normal military routine. While historically contractors had served 
a support role to traditional armed forces, the LOGCAP arrangement entrenched 
this relationship even further, to the point where the military was often completely 
reliant on contractors for a number of resources that would ensure military 
success. 
One considerable test of the new LOGCAP system was during Operation 
Joint Endeavor, the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 1995. The main 
LOGCAP contract recipient was Brown and Root (BRSC), an energy company 
from Houston, Texas with ties to former Defense Secretary Richard Cheney 
(Shrader 1999, p. 10). During Operation Joint Endeavor, BRSC established a 
number of bases, provided food and water to military forces, removed trash, and 
even provided some instances of police support at certain areas (Kidwell 2005, 
Palmer 1999). Overall, the LOGCAP experience in Bosnia was a glowing success 
in terms of the cooperation and efficiency of contractors in supporting military 
forces. For example, observers cite the experience at Mount Zep as illustrative of 
this success, as contractors arrived approximately 30 minutes after the military 
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captured the hill, and established a formidable operating base on the mountain 
within weeks (Palmer 1999). One scholar referred to the Bosnian experience as 
exemplifying ''the successes the Army experienced with contractors as a force 
multiplier" (Palmer 1999). In addition to the Bosnia case, the LOGCAP 
framework would prove vital in a number of additional post-Cold War 
engagements including Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Southwest Asia (Kidwell 
2005). 
Overall, the post-Cold War environment was the breeding ground the 
modem PMCs that are the focus of this analysis. As mentioned earlier, the 
changing nature of warfare and political restraints fostered much of the evolution 
in the private military sphere. One scholar put it succinctly enough "During the 
1990s, W estem governments increasingly shied away from sending national 
troops into conflicts in the Third World" (Uesseler 2008, p. 117). Many of these 
developing world conflicts were religious or ethnic in nature, and as a result, not 
particularly popular domestically. For these reasons, contractors found willing 
consumers of their products, and filled a need for American policy makers. In 
addition to this (or in response to) this changing environment, LOGCAP 
established a legal framework for the complete integration of contractors into the 
American military machine. Contractors had been support roles in a domestic 
sense for most of the course of American military history. The 1990s and 
LOGCAP changed this relationship in a drastic manner. Forthcoming events 
would alter the relationship even further. 
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The Global War on Terrorism and PMCs 
When 19 individuals associated with Al-Qaeda hijacked four American 
planes on the morning of September 111h, 2001, the world was forever changed. 
President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism in the following 
months, and plans were drawn up to attack terrorists in the Middle East, Africa, 
and any other location that harbored anti-American Islamic Fundamentalism. 
Following the decade of growth under LOGCAP and the changing global 
dynamics, PM Cs were eager and available to lend a hand. Journalist Jeremy 
Scahill even makes the argument that the "attacks almost instantly accelerated an 
agenda of privatization" and that those in power oversaw the "explosion of a $100 
billion global for-profit military industry" (Scahill 2007, p. l 05). 
Starting in September 200 I, large contracts were beginning to be awarded. 
For example, Blackwater was awarded a $35.7 million dollar contract for military 
training for the Navy, a $610,000 dollar contract for consulting and training work 
with the FBI, and a number of other considerable contracts with numerous federal 
agencies and bureaus (Scahill 2007, p. l 05-106). KBR, a long standing contracting 
partner for the US Army was also employed, along with 58 other organizations 
(Kidwell 2005, p.30) As alluded to earlier, most of these contracts were for 
training purposes only, but once the American armed forces started operations, 
this role would change significantly. 
In October 200 I, America and allies began bombing operations in 
Afghanistan under the directive of Operation Enduring Freedom. By May of 2002, 
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contractors were hitting the ground in Afghanistan in considerable numbers. 
Blackwater was awarded a contract for 20 men to protect a clandestine CIA 
facility in Afghanistan, with expressed orders to kill anyone who posed a threat or 
that they deemed a threat (Pelton 2006, p. 37-38). While on paper these 
Blackwater contractors were nothing more than the contractors of the past, 
providing logistical support, in practice they were an entirely different animal. 
Former Blackwater executive Jamie Smith described the operation as essentially 
being the "CIA's paramilitary wing" (Pelton 2006, p. 38). For the first time in 
American history, contractors were given the go-ahead to use force, and as a 
result, the line between contractors and the military was blurred, if not entirely 
removed. 
Contractors continued to provide essential support, training, and security 
roles throughout the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
For example, contractors from the Dyncorp Corporation were given a contract to 
protect Afghan President Hamid Karzai in early 2003, while KBR and others 
constructed and staffed the number of American, and in some cases NATO, bases 
in country in Afghanistan (Kidwell 2005, p.29-31 ). In the same way that 
LOGCAP was an indicator of things to come, the new security role that some 
PM Cs were given in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom were 
indicative of an alarming trend to come. 
By early 2003, American policy makers, including President George W. 
Bush were looking forward to the next course of the Global War on Terror. On 
March 20, 2003, American forces invaded Iraq with the expressed purpose of 
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toppling Saddam Hussein's Baath Party regime and establishing a constitutional 
democracy in its place. As is true of all preceding wars in American history, 
American forces were accompanied by private contractors. However, the 
contractors that accompanied Operation Iraqi Freedom were a new breed of 
contractors, ones that were numerous, fearless, and given the ability to use force. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the contractors that the Bush Administration 
had employed early on was Blackwater. Blackwater, a firm that started off 
training police officers to respond to school shootings, was an ideological entity 
that sought to support the US mission in any way possible (Scahill 2007, p.106-
107). Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince, argued that Blackwater's goal was to do 
for "the national security apparatus what FedEx did for the Post Office" 
(The Week 2014). In reality, what Blackwater, and other contractors, did was 
completely reinvent the relationship between contractors and the American 
military through their actions during the Iraq War and subsequent occupation. 
In the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it looked like business as 
usual however. ABT Associates was awarded a contract for medical training and 
supplies for the Iraqi Health Ministry, and DynCorp received a contract to provide 
supplies and training for the Iraqi Police (Kidwell 2005, p. 31-32). However, at 
this time other, more nefarious, contracts were being awarded. For example, 
Erinys International was given a contract to protect Iraqi oil pipelines, while 
CusterBattles was granted a contract to protect the Iraqi airport from both 
domestic and incoming threats and risks (Kidwell 2005, p.31 ). These latter jobs 
granted contractors wide latitude when it came to the use of force, as these 
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contractors were assuming roles that had traditionally fallen on military entities. 
This intermingling of private actors participating in traditional military roles 
would continue to define and haunt the Iraq War and occupation. 
By June 2003, the Invasion oflraq was over, Saddam had been toppled, 
and it appeared US Coalition forces, including its contractor partners that 
numbered in the thousands, were victorious. However, only half of the war had 
been won. Next came the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq in order to mold 
the Iraq that the White House had envisioned. The man tasked with overseeing the 
reconstruction of Iraq was one L. Paul Bremer III. Bremer, a longtime Republican 
aide with ties to the White House, began his work by firing thousands of Iraqi 
civil servants and dissolving the Iraqi military in an effort to "de-Baathify" the 
Iraqi populace. Many argued that this would only serve to anger the population as 
one analyst put it "if you starve a man, he's ready to shoot the occupier" (Scahill 
2007, p.129). Unfortunately, Bremer's action led to distrust towards the 
Provisional government which only served to fuel and support the already present 
guerilla resistance. In response to the growing threat, Bremer required security. 
The White House hired Blackwater on a sole source bid to protect their lead man 
in the reconstruction of Iraq. 
For the first time in American history, private contractors were solely 
responsible for the well-being and survival of a top American diplomat and 
administrator. Blackwater's contract with the US Government called for "personal 
security detail and two helicopters" for Bremer, which included a heavily armed 
and armored convoy (Scahill 2007, p.133). In his own words, Blackwater founder 
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Erik Prince argues that "Blackwater' s men helped protect the ambassador from 
ambush attempts on the roads, rocket attacks in the Green Zone, and increasingly 
hostile Iraqis in general" (Prince 2013, p.77) In the same way that the Secret 
Service protects the President during his travels, Blackwater protected Paul 
Bremer. Overall, by most accounts, Blackwater was successful in its mission. 
Despite their success though, this example further illustrates how much military 
contractors had changed over the course of American history, and how prevalent 
they had become as a foreign policy tool. Private military contractors were now 
frontline actors who were responsible for protecting high ranking civilian leaders 
and were given leeway in their use of force. Unfortunately, significant events 
would test the limits of the relationship, and present considerable questions for 
American policy makers. 
Blackwater in Fallujah and Nisour Square 
After roughly of year of Bremer's presence in Iraq, the situation all 
throughout the country was tumultuous to say the least. Baghdad was infested 
with looting and pillaging, and the countryside was fraught with extremists and 
militia groups. The situation was similar in Fallujah. While the citizens of 
Fallujah had established a patchwork administrative body that respected the 
occupation, while also flexing some authority over daily Iraqi life, insurgents still 
threatened the safety of the occupying forces (Scahill 2007, p.155-156). 
Following several high visibility attacks from Saddam loyalists and other 
insurgents, the First Marine Expeditionary Force took control of the city with the 
expressed goal of cleansing the city of insurgents and engaged in a number of 
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conflicts and skirmishes throughout Fallujah (Scahill 2007, p.157-164). It was 
into this maelstrom that Blackwater and the whole private military contractor 
industry was entering, and the results would be disastrous. 
On March 31 5\ 2004, four Blackwater contractors, tasked with 
transporting supplies across Fallujah were murdered by insurgents, and their 
bodies hanged and defiled for the cameras and the world (Hills 2006; Scahill 2007, 
p.164-168). While contractors had served a variety of roles throughout American 
history, this marked a turning point for contractor-military relations. As journalist 
Jeremy Scahill wrote, "it was the Mogadishu moment of the Iraq War," the only 
difference being that these men were not military forces, but contractors 
employed by the United States Government. For the first time, Americans were 
made aware of the extent of private military contractors fighting their wars when 
they saw the charred and mutilated bodies in March 2004. As Erik Prince wrote 
"people who previously hadn't known a thing about PMCs now had but one 
horrible scene-and one name-to associate with the industry" (Prince 2013, 
p.122). Another issue was made apparent in the media coverage of the war. In the 
US, many outlets referred to those that were killed as "civilians," which is 
technically and legally correct, however, Iraqi sources and others found 
contention with the fact that these "civilians" were highly armed and had engaged 
in raids and assaults (Uesseler 2008, p.160). The presence of contractors was 
made apparent to the world for the first time. Unfortunately, the turmoil 
surrounding Blackwater, and by extension all contractors, would again swirl in 
magnificent fashion only a few years later. 
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Throughout 2007, Blackwater convoys and contractors were under attack 
on regular occasion. For example, militants had shot down a Blackwater 
helicopter, ambushed several convoys, and laid improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) in the path of their vehicles (Prince 2013, p.208). On September 16th, 2007, 
a Blackwater convoy entered a heavily congested part of Baghdad known as 
Nisour Square. What happened next varies from source to source however. 
According to journalists and the Iraqi witnesses, Blackwater opened fire in 
response to a nearby car bomb and confusion, but used "excessive force" that 
ended the lives of9 Iraqi civilians (Scahill 2007, p.2-9; The Washington Post 
2007). In contrast, Erik Prince argues that the scenario did not represent a crime 
as the men were well trained and vetted, and that they only began firing out of 
necessity due to time constraints and the pressure of the moment (Prince 2013, p. 
211). Despite Prince's objections, the four Blackwater contractors were found 
guilty on October 22nd, 2014 of killing the Iraqi civilians (The New York Times 
2014). Also in response to these attacks, the US Congress investigated Blackwater 
and its founders in 2007 for charges of excessive force and abuse of contracting 
practices. Private contracting had gone from a logistical support, to a political and 
military hazard. 
Conclusion 
When combat operations ended in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world had 
witnessed the largest mercenary army in history support the most powerful 
military in the world. In 2003, the contractor count had reached 20,000 personnel, 
while Scahill claims that the US occupation utilized the largest concentration of 
44 
contractors since World War 2 (Kidwell 2005, p.29; Scahill 2007). Additionally, 
Wise (2012, p.2) shows that by early 2008, there were 190,000 contractors in Iraq, 
compared to 200,000 military personnel, a ratio of almost 1 to 1. As written in the 
introduction, my effort was to illustrate the prevalence, and changing nature, of 
PMCs in American military history. A consideration of the numbers, in 
combination with the variety of historical examples, serves that end. 
It is without question that the tragedy at Fallujah, and the shootings at 
Nisour Square greatly impacted the relationship between contractors and the US 
government. However, it is worth noting that throughout the US invasion and 
occupation of Iraq that other contractors including KBR, Dyncorp, and Triple 
Canopy provided the traditional logistic role that had defined the role of 
contractors throughout US military history. However, the importance of the 
Blackwater case is that it illustrates the extreme end of contracting that has 
resulted from their prevalence in US policy, particularly in the post-Cold War 
world. Contractors have longed served an important and vital role supporting 
American military missions by assuming non-combat roles to ease the burden on 
the US military. From the support roles of early wars to the frontline security 
roles of Iraq and Afghanistan, PM Cs have been instrumental in American foreign 
and domestic policy. While the role has changed, one should also consider how 
the actor themselves have changed. For example, the literature shows that 
mercenaries and PMCs are different entities that serve nearly identical functions, 
that is PMCs are mercenaries in a sense, while also being an entirely new actor. 
The analysis also provides evidence to this end. Instead of being a haphazard 
45 
collection of non-military men arranged by individual commanders for varying 
reasons, the modem PMC is a conglomerate of massive size that is coordinated 
and functions like a business through its reliance on government contracts. 
Additionally, the historical analysis chapter addresses other concerns 
regarding PM Cs, namely the moral concerns. As we have seen in the case of 
Blackwater, PMCs can and have posed serious normative and moral challenges to 
the American government. If unchecked, the privatization of force can breed 
corruption and abuse. However, what this chapter most clearly illustrates is that 
private actors have had an important role in the way the country wages war, and 
that this relationship is unlikely to end any time soon. 
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Chapter Three: Economic Analysis of PM Cs 
This analysis focuses entirely on the economic trends and realities related 
to private military contractors and American foreign and domestic policy. This 
chapter will be consist of two separate sections that both inform and work off of 
each other, while also demonstrating individuals facets of the economic impact of 
the privatization of military force through PMCs. The first section will focus on 
the arguments for and against PMCs from an economic perspective, focused on 
the theory of economic privatization that has been touched on earlier. The second 
section will be a quantitative consideration of how contract spending from the 
Department of Defense and the Department of State has changed over time, and 
how this informs what we already, and will, know about the prevalence and 
impact of PM Cs. 
Privatization and PMCs 
As previously mentioned, the thrust of the first section of this chapter will 
be to consider the economic arguments in favor of, and that led to, PMCs being a 
prevalent actor in American foreign and domestic policy. As mentioned 
throughout this text, the end of the Cold War brought about the climate and 
environment that would give rise to the modem PMC. However, a more thorough 
consideration of this era, particularly regarding the economic climate of this time, 
would be beneficial to this analysis. Singer (2005, p.49-50) argues that two 
nuanced factors that resulted from the end of the Cold War personify the change 
in environment circum~tances and predicated the evolution of PM Cs: change in 
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the nature of warfare and the "privatization revolution." In regards to the change 
in the nature of warfare, Singer (2005, p.49-50) argues that warfare became more 
varied, globalized, and dangerous which were exacerbated by the demobilization 
of forces in the West and the Soviet Union. These factors combined to present 
challenges on both sides of warfare, at a time when the largest and most powerful 
armies were either shrinking or directing their attention elsewhere. However, the 
changing nature of warfare is only half of the equation. 
Singer (2005) makes a two part argument regarding the post-Cold War 
climate. While I have demonstrated the changing nature of warfare, a 
consideration of privatization is still in order. To address this assertion, one 
requires an answer to the question: what exactly is the "privatization revolution?" 
Singer (2005, p.66-68) argues that Reagan and Thatcher's reintroduction of 
conservatism to the West and successes of privatization of governmental activity 
in America and Latin America, coupled with the failure of the centralized 
command economies of the former Soviet Union brought privatization to the 
attention of policy makers. Following the global realignment of the end of the 
Cold War, many countries viewed privatization as a way of revitalizing 
economies and entrenching democracy, thus the proliferation of privatization in 
the post-Cold War world and the "privatization revolution." Overall, the 
revolution in privatization was a global response to the centralized command 
economies of the Soviet bloc and the stalled Keynesian economies of parts of the 
Western World, and gave rise to the economy and environment in which military 
contractors could thrive. 
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While Singer and others make convincing political arguments regarding 
the rise of privatization, I feel a brief consideration of the economic arguments 
related to privatization are in order as well. In the most general sense, many 
economists find that privatization does indeed reduce costs for governments at all 
levels by reducing waste, inefficiencies, and by lowering labor costs (Afriff, 
Cabanda, and Sathye 2009; Lundvist 1988; Megginson 2000). Additionally, other 
economists have found that privatization in recent years has become doubly 
effective because of the breakdown of the state monopoly on the use of force, and 
the integration of privatization into traditionally state-centric enterprises (Apgar 
IV and Keane 2004). As illustrated here, privatization in the abstract sense can 
lead to greater savings in government according to economists, but there still 
exists a debate over whether or not the employment of PM Cs offers much savings 
at all. 
In their book The Three Trillion Dollar War, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) 
attempt to calculate the true cost of the Iraq War. The central argument of their 
piece is that the Iraq feature considerable instances of waste and fraud, and that 
one of the main factors driving the bloated cost and financial liabilities in the war 
was the use of private contractors (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). Additionally, a 2008 
Congressional Research Service Report found that ''the total direct cost to the U.S. 
Government for acquiring security services in Iraq is not known" but that some 
CBO estimates place the number near $4 billion dollars since 2003 (Elsea 2008, 
p.4). During a House Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, Chairman 
Remy Waxman articulate that $4 billion had been sent to contractors for the 
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reconstruction phase alone, but that this number does not include funding for 
other contractor services such as training or security services (Elsea 2008, p.4). 
In addition to these raw numbers, some scholars believe that contractors 
imposed costs in other ways. For example, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) are critical 
of contractor presence forcing the United States military to pay higher bonuses to 
attract talent away from contractors. Other concerns raised include instances of 
fraud and waste, including payment for work that was never completed, sole 
source and cost-plus contracts, and just overall incompetence and corruption 
(Kopecki 2006; Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). While these scholars certainly make 
intriguing and compelling arguments regarding the ill-advised financial decision 
to use PMCs, others contend that privatization, even when done in the form of 
PMCs, does indeed provide considerable savings for governmental entities. 
In his piece "Outsourcing Wars," Wise (2012) contends that despite 
considerable investments in PMCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars that the 
use of contractors actually provides considerable savings for the United States 
government. For example, in regards to death benefits Wise (2012, p.46) 
highlights that while families of contractors that are killed in the field receive 
death benefits, these benefits are capped, unlike military benefits, which can have 
a very pronounced and noticeable impact on long term federal spending 
projections. Thus, since all PMCs are considered the same entity under US law, 
those that provide security such as Blackwater are presented with similar benefits 
to a cook, while engaging in much more dangerous work. Similar caps exist in 
regards to injury as well. If a contractor is injured in the exact same manner as a 
50 
traditional soldier is, both actors would receive benefits until healed, but the 
presence of a cap would lead to contractors receiving less benefits overall than a 
military member (Wise 2012, p. 56). 
The impact of the caps and other regulations on contractors is not readily 
apparent until one considers the numbers behind the disparity. I will use the 
example of an Anny Corporal and contractor that both suffer a severe leg injury 
using numbers provide by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) and Wise (2012). The 
contractor would receive 66.67% percent of their weekly pay for the duration of 
the injury, while the Army Corporal would receive 75% of his or her monthly pay. 
However, these benefits would continue for the remainder of the Anny Corporal's 
life, while the contractor would only receive temporary benefits (Wise 2012). 
Overall, while the contractor would receive a larger sum in the short term, the 
Anny Corporal would receive moderate benefits but for a longer expanse of time. 
Assuming the contractor made $1000 a week and the Anny Corporal made $565 a 
week, the contractor would receive $162,748 for one year, while the Army 
Corporal would receive $70,344.56 a year for the rest of his life. (Stiglitz and 
Bilmes 2008, Wise 2012) As you can see, the long term cost commitments are 
considerably smaller for contractors than for traditional military actors. 
Overall, Wise (2012) points out that when considering long term spending 
in regards to health insurance and injury and death benefits, the cases of Iraq and 
Afghanistan indicate that it is actually cheaper to utilize PMCs in dangerous role 
as their death and injury benefits are subjected to limitations that can amount to 
considerable savings for the federal government. However, relying too heavily on 
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contractors could have an inverse effect in the future if those who are contracted 
to fight believe that the limited benefits are insufficient compensation for the level 
of work they are engaged in. 
As illustrated here, there are compelling cases to be made on both sides of 
the PMC debate. While it is hard to dismiss the argument that the financial 
commitments to PMCs in the short term are substantial, the long term impacts of 
PMCs provide greater understanding of their value in regards to using force. 
However, both sides of the debate illustrate the central thrust of this chapter: 
PM Cs account for a considerable share of Defense and State department spending 
despite their relative obscurity. 
Considering the Numbers behind the Explosion in Contracting 
The first section of this chapter dealt with the debates surrounding the 
economic value of using contractors as a tool of foreign and domestic policy. 
However, that only accounts for half of the picture. I believe a consideration of 
how substantial PMCs are in a quantitative sense provides additional support for 
establishing the prevalence of PM Cs as a political actor. 
As established throughout this piece, the explosion of PM Cs on the global 
arena occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also demonstrated 
throughout this piece is that the United States embraced PMCs wholeheartedly 
during the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these two truths, I will be 
considering only modem data from 2000 onward. Using USASpending.Gov 
(2014), I chart the growth in contractors from bi-annually from 2000 to 2010 and 
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comment on the findings and trends following the associated graphs. The search 
parameters will include only contracts and not grants, loans, or other associated 
terms. I chose to only search contracts as the literature shows that PMCs are most 
often tendered contracts instead of other federal funding types. I chose to only use 
the Department of Defense and the Department of State as cases because these 
departments are usually those that employ PMCs for security and construction 
purposes. The findings for the Department of Defense are presented in Graph 1 
and the findings for the Department of State are found in Graph 2: 
Graph 1: Department of Defense Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010 
Department of Defense Bi-Annual Contract 
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Graph 2: Department of State Bi-Annual Contract Spending, 2000-2010 
Department of State Bi-Annual Contract 
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As you can see from the graphs, the general spending trends that were 
predicted in the literature review and throughout this paper are indeed supported 
by the numbers. Overall, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan featured significant 
contract investments from the Departments of Defense and State. For example, 
from 2000 to 2008, contractor spending increased considerably for both 
Departments, from $150 billion to nearly $400 billion for the Defense Department 
and from $1.5 billion to nearly $8 billion for the State Department. Overall, while 
the salience of PMCs to the average voter is very low, this small portion of data 
illustrates that it should be much higher. PMCs accounted for over half of the 
budget for the Department of Defense from 2004 to 2010. This demonstrates the 
presence of significant public investment into a portion of the economy that not 
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many know, or seem to care, about and helps to support the overarching argument 
that PMCs are a prevalent actor in American foreign and domestic policy. To 
conclude, while at face value this analysis appears limited in scope, the chart 
presents a very simple truth: the United States government in recent years has 
relied heavily on PMCs, and the budget allocations prove this. 
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Chapter Four: Legal Analysis of PM Cs 
The final analysis will focus on the legal presence of PM Cs. Throughout 
American history, we have relied on the various court systems throughout the 
country to protect our constitutional rights and to enact justice when necessary. 
Court rulings can greatly impact the political and social climate, and can set the 
legal and statutory precedent for issues ranging from gun rights to reproductive 
and civil rights. Through the basic act of ruling on issues or actors, courts have an 
instant legitimizing or delegitimizing impact on whatever the subject is. 
Additionally, when legislation is passed, and upheld, it provides a legitimizing 
effect on issues. From this logic, I will again prove the long standing and 
prevalent nature of PMCs through their presence in the American legal system. 
The first major legal precedent established regarding PMCs was in 1941. 
In 1941, Congress passed the Defense Base Act. This act requires companies that 
receive federal contracts and have personnel who perform contractual duties 
outside of the United States to obtain worker's compensation insurance in case of 
injury or death (Wise 2012, p. 35). As mentioned earlier, World War 2 was the 
setting for a considerable contractor presence, and in response to this, the United 
States Congress acted. While not substantial by any measure, the Defense Base 
Act presents the one of the first indications of the legal entrenchment of PMCs. 
While not civilian law, the introduction of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) had immeasurable impact on how PMCs were treated under the 
law for much of the 20th century. In 1950, when the UCMJ was enacted, it ruled 
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that "those serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field" were 
subject to the exact same rules and specifications as traditional armed forces 
(Lindemann 2007, p.86). That is to say that contractors were on equal footing 
with traditional armed forces when it came to being under the purview of military 
law. For example, under the UCMJ, contractors could be court martialed for any 
violation or atrocity as a traditional soldier. However, changes in the UCMJ from 
civilian courts would greatly impact the relationship between the UCMJ and 
contractors. 
In 1957, the Supreme Court ruled that the military could not court martial 
civilian contractors in the same way as military forces as the Court ruled that that 
applying military law to civilians in this instance was unconstitutional 
(Lindemann 2007, p.86). This ruling created a gap in the legal lexicon which 
granted contractors greater freedom in war zones in regards to their behavior 
when compared to other armed forces. It was not only civilian courts that began to 
carve out niches for contractors though. In 1970, a contractor convicted of a war 
crime was acquitted by a military court because their interpretation of war was 
different than the one presented in the UCMJ (Lindemann 2007, p.86). The 
UCMJ definition of "war" rested on the actual act of declaring war from Congress, 
and not the unilateral action that was Vietnam (Lindemann 2007, p.86). Despite 
initially strong regulations on PMCs and their actions, courts both military and 
civilian carved out a legal void where PMCs were able to act unilaterally in most 
instances with little legal regulation or ramification. 
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This near-immunity status of contractors would only be reinforced in 1987. 
In their ruling on Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, the Supreme Court 
established the legal precedent known to legal scholars as the "government 
contractor defense" (Christensen and Battista 2009, p.12). This ruling created a 
legal grounds for defense in response to product liability concerns and lawsuits. 
According to Christensen and Battista (2009, p.13) the "government contractor 
defense existed under federal common law" and in effect "barred the plaintiffs 
state law design defect claim." In other words, it is almost impossible to sue to 
find liable contractors that supply goods for the military for wrong doing if their 
provided goods should injure or kill someone, as was the case with this hearing. 
Again, a civilian court ruled in favor of PM Cs and established a legal precedent to 
protect them from lawsuits for wrongdoing. Not only could PMCs no longer be 
tried as a military entity, the Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation ruling 
created a precedent for defense from liability lawsuits. 
Following these rulings, contractors were basically self-regulating entities. 
The military and civilian courts had few, if any, ways to rein in the actions of 
PM Cs. However, in 2000, Congress attempted to provide some level of regulation 
to PMCs through the passage of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA). MEJA made it possible for contractors employed under the Department 
of Defense to be brought back to American to be tried for "any crime that would 
be a felony under US law" (Lindemann 2007, p.86). On paper, MEJA represented 
the first serious effort to rein in contractors since the UCMJ. However, 
Lindemann (2007, p.86) argues that MEJA has had "little visible effect" on the 
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behavior of PM Cs and how they are tried by the United States legal system. 
Unfortunately, much like the UCMJ, legal interpretation and language has greatly 
impacted the potential impact of the bill. For instance, the MEJA protects only 
contractors employed by the Department of Defense, not those employed by other 
branches of the federal government. This provides a large exemption because the 
State Department and the Department of the Interior employ contractors that 
behave similar to those in the Department of Defense, yet the MEJA does not 
apply to these contractors. 
Unfortunately, the shortcomings of MEJA would be highlighted in the 
Saleh v. Titan Corp ruling. In 2009, Iraqi citizen Haidar Muhsin Saleh brought a 
state law-based tort action against Titan Corporation over the treatment he 
received while at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Mr. Saleh claimed that both 
American soldiers and PMC forces physically injured and berated him, including 
such vile acts as forced sodomy, electric shock, and beatings and dragging. When 
Saleh's case was heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the 
court created a rule where PMCs were immune from state tort liability only when 
the "contractor's employees were acting under the direct command and exclusive 
operation control of the military" (Perry 2013, p.608). However, when an appeal 
was heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the 
court ruled that PMCs could not be sued for a state law tort "where the PMC is 
integrated into military combatant activities during wartime" (Perry 2013, p.608). 
Instead of providing some protections for those abused by PMCs, the Saleh V. 
Titan ruling ended up protecting PMCs even further. Unfortunately, the apparent 
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legal trend regarding PM Cs is one of immense protection and varying levels of 
legal immunity. 
As illustrated here, the legal legacy of PM Cs is long and varied. While 
attempts have been made to rein in PMCs and their abuses, the legal system 
seems to side with PMCs most of the time. Despite some instances to the 
contrary, the previously mentioned recent conviction of those Blackwater 
contractors present at Nisour Square for example, PMCs appear to pose a 
legitimate legal dilemma for American policy makers. However, the purpose of 
this chapter was not to form a legal opinion of PM Cs. Instead, this chapter was to 
illuminate even further the prevalence of PMCs in American foreign and domestic 
policy. While the legal focus is brief and focused, the purpose is not affected. In 
the end, the legal considerations surrounding PMCs presents even more evidence 
of their prevalence in American life. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
The end of the Cold War brought about monumental changes in the global 
political climate. One of those changes is the marked rise in the use of private 
military contractors to enact political and military ends. While scholars accept that 
PMCs are a modem phenomena, the American public appears to be neglectful of 
this truth, and maybe even of their existence at all. Additionally, scholars have 
looked at PMCs in a broad sense while neglecting focused case studies It is this 
gap that this research hopes to plug. Following a brief consideration of PM Cs and 
a number of factors surrounding them, I established that PMCs were not a salient 
issue to the American electorate according to the framework established by 
Epstein and Segal (2000). I then demonstrated that while the American electorate 
pays little attention to PMCs, they are pervasive, prevalent, and an important 
phenomena in American foreign and domestic policy. Through a consideration of 
their political, historical, and military contributions, I was able to illustrate that 
PM Cs have existed in some capacity even back to the days of the Revolutionary 
War, while also demonstrating that modem PMCs are unique in and of 
themselves, and that they are shaping American foreign and domestic policy in 
many impactful ways. 
The historical consideration played a number of roles in the analysis. First, 
the analysis effectively illustrated the long-standing nature of private actors in 
American military endeavors. This qualitative consideration provided the most 
essential and telling evidence of PMC infiltration in American foreign and 
domestic policy. By considering how military actors interacted with, and relied on, 
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these actors, their prevalence was established and also illustrated the closeness of 
this historical bond. Secondly, while establishing their sheer presence was vital, 
the historical analysis also addressed the number of factors that contributed to 
marked growth and change in the realm of private military contractors. From the 
early patchwork systems of the Revolutionary War to the corporate bodies of the 
PMCs in Iraq, the historical section supported the literature while also providing 
other insights into PMC behavior. Overall, the historical section provided an in-
depth demonstration of the depth and breadth of the relationship between 
American military actors and private actors. 
However, the political and military consideration was only part of the 
picture. I then relied on narrow, but focused, examinations of the economic and 
legal legacy of PMCs as a way of further illustrating my point. Overall, the 
considerable contract investments of the past decade, combined with the legal 
legacy left by congressional acts and court rulings, filled in even more of the 
picture. The ramifications of the economic analysis deserve some special attention. 
As illustrated by the graphs, the contractual obligations to PMCs rose 
dramatically in the early to mid-2000s, a point in line with the literature on the 
topic. What the economic analysis illustrated above all is that PMCs are not some 
abstract actors working near the fringes, but are entities that consume 
considerable portions of the Department of Defense budget. This presents reasons 
for salience, while providing comparative concerns regarding the low salience. 
The legal analysis shows that not only do PMCs exist in the military realm, 
but that they are also phenomena that have required government and judicial 
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regulation and rulings. One truth of American public discourse is that the 
discussion is often shaped by how Congress and the Supreme Court rules or 
interprets certain issues, and in the case of PM Cs, this is no different. The legal 
analysis had a legitimizing impact on PM Cs. One of the true values of the legal 
analysis is that it demonstrated that PMCs do not exist in the fringes of black ops, 
but are an issue that have been judged by the major political institutions of the 
country. One facet unexplored in this piece is the impact Supreme Court rulings 
and pieces of legislation have on salience, and perhaps an analysis of these factors 
in regards to PMC-centered rulings and legislation would be fruitful. 
Yet I must also acknowledge that there are some limitations regarding 
pieces of this work. To begin, the approach utilized to measure salience has some 
shortcomings. While I utilized only one specific publication, perhaps greater 
insight would be provided by a greater examination of salience through the 
inclusion of additional newspapers. Additionally, one could focus the search 
beyond simply headlines, and perhaps cull different results. Continuing, there 
deserves some elaboration on the Defense and State Department data. While I 
narrowed the search parameters on USASpending.Gov to only include contracts, 
there is the very real possibility that the numbers are inflated. While PMCs are 
funded through contracts, other non-PMC entities, particularly in the State 
Department, are also funded through contracts, and as a result this could inflate 
the numbers. However, I anticipate that this does not impact the level to which we 
invest in PM Cs, but instead only provides some limitations on the accuracy of the 
given data. Additionally, little time is spent considering American political culture 
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and civil-military relations and the vast body of literature in those fields and the 
' 
influence these fields could have on our understanding of PM Cs. Overall, while 
these limitations exist, I do not believe that they directly contradict or severely 
impact the results of the analyses, but instead provide potential for future research. 
It is also important to discuss how valid the research and findings are 
internally and externally. For starters, it is apparent that the evidence does indicate 
that PMCs are a long-standing and prevalent force in American history, thus 
leading to internal validity. While I do not seek to undermine this truth, external 
validity should be considered as well. I see no reason why this research could not 
be replicated for other Western countries such as Great Britain, Australia, and 
Germany. One factor that the literature focused on was that PM Cs are usually 
employed by wealthier countries. These countries are wealthier, and have had 
long military histories, much like the United States, and would provide 
comparable baselines. However, even if one was not to do a comparative style 
paper, I believe it would be easy to demonstrate the long standing nature of 
private warriors in some capacity throughout history of any country or people. 
The research and findings also have considerable implications for policy 
and political theory. While it was touched on briefly, a consideration of PM Cs as 
a solution to the collective action problem of national defense would be fruitful 
and informative, and would help to inform our understanding of why PM Cs are 
employed even more. A more thorough investigation of the economic savings of 
PMCs vs. traditional armed forces would help to settle the brewing debate over 
the cost-savings of employing PMCs. Wise's (2012) piece only considered a 
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narrow window of time, and perhaps an expansion of his research focus would 
provide additional details or compelling caveats in the actual financial savings 
associated with PMCs. Finally, while this research does indeed illuminate the 
long entrenched nature of private warriors in American history, the findings also 
present numerous opportunities for future research. 
While scholars agree that the end of the Cold War brought about the rise 
of PM Cs, actors of their ilk appear to have a long vested interest in serving a war 
time role. However, the findings illustrate that overall, Americans are unaware of 
these actors and many of the costs and implications of their use. While we 
certainly understand some facets of the current PMCs, one can only speculate on 




Afriff, M, E. Cabanda, and M. Sathye. 2009. "Privatization and Performance: Evidence from 
Telecommunications Sector." The Journal of the Operational Research Society 60(10): 
1315-1321. 
Apgar IV, Mahlon and John M. Keane. 2004. "New Business with the New Military." Harvard 
Business Review September: 45-56. 
Avant, Deborah D. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Byrne, E.F. 2007. "Assessing Arms Makers' Corporate Social Responsibility." Journal of 
Business Ethics 74(3): 201-217. 
Carroll, A.B. 1979. "A Three Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance." 
Journal of Business Ethics 15(4): 497-505. 
Chambers II, John Whiteclay. 1999. The Oxford Companion to American Military History. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt, eds. 2007. From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Christensen, Christopher R. and Anthony Battista. 2009. "Framing the Government Contractor 
Defense: Origin, Extension, and Potential." Brie/38(2):12-23. 
Cohn, Lindsay P. 2011. "It Wasn't in My Contract: Security Privatization and Civilian Control." 
Armed Forces and Society 37(3): 381-398. 
Cusumano, Eugentio and Christopher Kinsey. 2014. "Bureaucratic Interests and the Outsourcing 
of Security: The Privatization of Diplomatic Protection in the United States and the 
United Kingdom." Armed Forces and Society. 
66 
Edwards III, George C., Mitchell, William, and Reed Welch. 1995. "Explaining Presidential 
Approval: The Significance oflssue Salience." American Journal of Political Science 
39(1): 108-134. 
Eichenberg, Richard C. 2005. "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of 
Military Force, 1981-2005." International Security 30(1): 140-177. 
Elsea, Jennifer K, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura. 2008. "Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues.'' Congressional 
Research Service. August 25. 
Epstein, Lee and Jeffrey A. Segal. 2000. "Measuring Issue Salience." American Journal of 
Political Science 44(1): 66-83. 
Franke, Volker and Marc von Boemcken. 2011. "Guns for Hire: Motivations and Attitudes of 
Private Security Contractors." Armed Forces and Society 37(4): 725-742. 
Geraghty, Tony. 2009. Soldiers ofFortune: A History of the Mercenary in Modern Warfare. 
New York: Pegasus Books. 
Halpern, Barton H. and Keith F. Snider. 2012. "Products That Kill and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: The Case of U.S. Defense Firms." Armed Forces and Society 38(4): 604-
624. 
Hajjar, Remi M. 2013. "Emergent Postmodern US Military Culture." Armed Forces and Society 
40(1):118-145. 
Heinecken, Lindy. 2014. "Outsourcing Public Security: The Unforeseen Consequences for the 
Military Profession." Armed Forces and Society 40(4): 625-646. 
Hills, Alice. 2006. "Fear and Loathing in Fallujah." Armed Forces and Society 32(4):623-629. 
67 
Huston, James A. 1966. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953. Washington D.C.: 
Office of the Chief of Military History. 
Kidwell, Deborah C. 2005. "Public War, Private Fight?: The United States and Private Military 
Companies." Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12. Combat Studies Institute 
Press Fort Leavenworth Kansas. 
Kopecki, Dawn. 2006. "When Outsourcing Tums Outrageous." Business Week July 31. 
Krahmann, Elke. 2010. States, Citizens, and the Privatization of Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lanning, Michael Lee. 2005. Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, From Ancient Greece to Today's 
Private Military Companies. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Larson, Eric V. and Bogdan Savych. 2005. "American Public Support for Military Operations 
from Mogadishu to Iraq." RAND Corporation. 
http://\\>ww.rand.org/pubs/monograQhs/MG231.html. 
Lindemann, Marc. 2007. "Civilian Contractors Under Military Law." Parameters. Autumn. 
Lundqvist, Lennart J. 1988. "Privatization: Towards a Concept for Comparative Policy Analysis." 
Journal of Public Policy 8(1 ): 1-19. 
Megginson, William. 2000. "Privatization." Foreign Policy 118:14-27. 
Michaels, Jon D. 2010. "Privatization's Pretensions." The University of Chicago Law Review 77: 
717-780. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the The01y of Groups. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Owen, John M. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." International Security 
19(2): 87-125. 
68 
Palmer, Herman T. 1999. "More Tooth, Less Tail: Contractors in Bosnia." Army Logistician 
31(5). 
Pattison, James. 2010. "Deeper Objections to the Privatization of Military Force." The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 18(4): 425-447. 
Pattison, James. 2008. "Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force." Ethics and 
International Affairs 22(2): 143-162. 
Pelton, Robert Young. 2006. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror. New York: 
Crown. 
Percy, Sarah. 2006. Adelphi Paper 384: Regulating the Private Security Industry. London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Perry, Rodney M. 2013. "Fixing the Faults: An Argument Against the Saleh V. Titan Corp. 
Rule for Private Military Contractor Immunity." Public Contract Law Journal 42(3): 
607-627. 
Prince, Erik. 2013. Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of 
the War on Terror. New York: Penguin. 
Scahill, Jeremy. 2007. Blackwater: The Rise of The World's Most Powerful Mercenary Group. 
New York: MJF Books. 
Schooner, Steven L. and Collin D. Swan. 2012. "Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of 
Surrogates on the Public's Casualty Sensitivity." Journal of National Security Law and 
Policy. Forthcoming. 
Shearer, David. 1998. Adelphi Paper 316: Private Armies and Military Intervention. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Shrader, Charles R. 1999. "Contractors on the Battlefield." Landpower Essay Series 99(6): 1-17. 
69 
Silverstein, Ken. 2000. Private Warriors. New York: Verso. 
Singer, P.W. 2003. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Singer, P.W. 2005. "Outsourcing War." Foreign Affairs 84(2):119-132. 
Smith, R. Elberton. 1985. US Army in World War 2: The Army and Economic Mobilization. 
Washington D.C.: Center of Military History. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Linda J. Bilmes. 2008. The Three Trillion Dollar War. New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company LTD. 
Terry, James P. 2010. "Privatizing Defense Support Operations: The Need to Improve DoD's 
Oversight and Management." Armed Forces and Society 36(4): 660-670. 
The New York Times. 2014. "Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings." October 
22nd. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html (Accessed on 
November 5th, 2014). 
The Washington Post. 2007. "State Dept. Convoy Attacked in Baghdad, Sparking a Shootout." 
September 17th. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/16/ AR200709160 I 062.html (Accessed on November 5th, 
2014) 
TheWeek.com. 2014. "America's Private Sector Army." February th. 
http ://theweek.com/article/index/25 5924/americas-pri vate-sector-arm y (Accessed on 
November 2nd, 2014) 
Uesseler, Rolf. 2008. Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict. 
New York: Soft Skull Press. 
70 
USASpending.Gov. 2014. '"Prime Award Spending Data: By Agency." 
httn://w}.yw.usaspending_,gov/inde~_,p_hp?g=node%2F3&fiscal._y~ar"'all&tab=By+Agency 
(Accessed on November 1 J1h, 2014) 
Wise, Jimmie I. 2012. "Outsourcing Wars: Comparing Risks, Benefits, and Motivations of 
Contractors and Military Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009-2011)." MBA 
Professional Report. Naval Postgraduate School. 
71 
